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POISONING THE NEXT APPLE? 
THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT AND 
INDIVIDUAL INVENTORS 
David S. Abrams* 
R. Polk Wagner** 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the most significant patent law re-
form effort in two generations, may have a dark side: it seems likely to decrease 
the patenting behavior of individual inventors, a category which occupies special 
significance in American innovation history. In this Article, we empirically pre-
dict the effects of the major change in the law, which shifts the patent priority 
rules from the United States’ traditional “first-to-invent” system to the interna-
tionally predominant “first-to-file” system. While there has been some theoretical 
work on this topic, we use an analogous law change in Canada as a natural ex-
periment to shed the first empirical light on the question. 
Our analysis uses a difference-in-difference framework to estimate the im-
pact of the Canadian law change on small inventors. Using data on all patents 
granted by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, we find a significant drop in the share of patents granted to 
individual inventors in Canada coincident with the implementation of a first-to-
file system. We find no measurable changes in patent quality and perform several 
additional analyses to rule out alternative explanations. While the net welfare 
impact that can be expected from a shift to first-to-file is unclear, our results re-
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veal that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the March 2013 implementation 
of a first-to-file rule in the United States is likely to result in a reduced share of 
patents granted to individual inventors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The garage inventor is an American icon. The image of the solitary genius 
tinkering away in order to perfect her idea captures our imagination, and the 
long line of world-changing inventors and their companies—from Thomas Edi-
son (in Menlo Park, N.J. and West Orange, N.J.)1 to Bill Hewlett and David 
Packard (in Palo Alto)2 to Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs (in Los Altos)3—only 
confirms this uniquely American vision of innovation. The patent system works 
hand in hand with this sense of the small inventor by providing those who have 
little more than good ideas much-needed clout in the commercial marketplace. 
 
 1. See THOMAS A. MEYER, INNOVATE!: HOW GREAT COMPANIES GET STARTED IN 
TERRIBLE TIMES 30-31, 36, 38 (2010) (explaining that Edison’s first invention resulted from 
moonlighting after twelve-hour workdays as a telegraph operator for Western Union). 
 2. See ASHLEE VANCE, GEEK SILICON VALLEY: THE INSIDE GUIDE TO PALO ALTO, 
STANFORD, MENLO PARK, MOUNTAIN VIEW, SANTA CLARA, SUNNYVALE, SAN JOSE, SAN 
FRANCISCO 23-26 (2007) (describing the beginnings of the computer giant Hewlett-Packard 
in a garage in Palo Alto). 
 3. See JAN GOLDBERG, CAREERS FOR HOMEBODIES & OTHER INDEPENDENT SOULS 17 
(2d ed. 2007) (“Wozniak and Jobs designed what would be the Apple I in Jobs’s bedroom, 
and they built the prototype in Jobs’s garage.”). 
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Indeed, without the protection of inventions by the patent system, the world 
might never have known General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, or Apple.4  
On September 16, 2011, President Barack Obama signed into law the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA or the Act),5 almost certainly the most 
sweeping set of changes to the U.S. patent system in almost sixty years.6 The 
most important provision of the Act, and the subject of this Article, is the 
change in the rules used to establish priority between competing inventors.7  
Until March 16, 2013, the United States used a first-to-invent (FTI) priority 
rule.8 This means that when there was a dispute as to patent priority, the party 
that had the inventive idea first was entitled to the patent. This could be estab-
lished by using lab notebooks, emails, and other documentation of the date of 
invention. By contrast, a first-to-file (FTF) rule relies on the date (and possibly 
 
 4. For a critique of this idea, see Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (2012) (“The canonical story of the lone genius inventor is largely 
a myth. . . . Invention appears in significant part to be a social, not an individual, phenome-
non.”). 
 5.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(amending scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 6. The 1952 Patent Act was the last major reform of the patent system. See Jason 
Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Commentary, Toward a System of Invention Registration: 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 24 (2011), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/rantanenpetherbridge.pdf (“The recently 
enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act . . . represents the most significant legislative 
event affecting patent law and practice in more than half a century.”). President Obama made 
reform of the patent law one of the centerpieces of his 2011 economic policy agenda. See 
Remarks on the Federal Budget, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 542, at 2 (Aug. 2, 2011) 
(video of address available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/2011/August/080211_ 
DebtCompromise.mp4) (“Through patent reform, we can cut the red tape that stops too 
many inventors and entrepreneurs from quickly turning new ideas into thriving businesses, 
which holds our whole economy back.”). Thus, the structure of the U.S. patent system, usu-
ally the province of technocrats, academics, and high-tech lawyers, leapt to the top of the 
national discussion. Of course, for many observers, it had already been there: The financial 
press last summer was transfixed by a series of blockbuster deals involving patents. See, e.g., 
Quentin Hardy, Google Buys Motorola for Patent Parts, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/quentinhardy/2011/08/15/google-buys-motorola-for-patent-
parts; Chris V. Nicholson, Apple and Microsoft Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (July 1, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/apple-and-microsoft-
beat-google-for-nortel-patents. Even National Public Radio’s popular This American Life 
program joined the fray, with an hour-long program in July 2011 on “patent trolls.” See 
When Patents Attack!, THIS AM. LIFE (Chicago Public Media radio broadcast, July 22, 2011), 
available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-
attack. 
 7. See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 6, at 24 (noting the “AIA’s imposition of 
a first-to-file-or-first-to-publicly-disclose system, which replaces an over 200-year-old first-
to-invent tradition”). 
 8. Different provisions of the new law became effective at different times, ranging 
from the date of enactment of the AIA on September 16, 2011, until March 16, 2013. The 
relevant provisions here—the new priority rules—are effective for patent applications filed 
on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(n)(1) (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 100 note (2011)). 
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time) when a patent application was filed with the U.S. Patent Office for the 
priority determination. As we explain further below, the AIA implements a 
modified version of the traditional FTF rule, wherein in most cases the first in-
ventor to publish his invention will be given the rights (as long as he follows 
the publication with a timely application to the U.S. Patent Office).9 But in 
broad strokes, the Act implements a shift in American patent law from FTI to 
FTF; the United States is the last country to make this change in its patent  
system.10  
Although the FTF system has advantages—it is simpler and less costly to 
administer, and it encourages earlier patent applications11—it may have a dark-
er side for small inventors.12 Since they are likely to be slower in turning an in-
vention into a patent application than larger corporations, they will be less like-
ly to win a patent race. Under the FTI rule, this was not especially relevant, 
because the date of invention determined patent priority and the scope of prior 
art. But under FTF, a successful patentee must not only invent, but also win the 
race to draft and submit a patent application that satisfies the requirements of 
the patent law. Companies with significant research and development (R&D) 
operations are more likely to have patent attorneys on staff with experience 
working with the company’s inventors. This can substantially cut down the 
time necessary to transform an invention into an application. Small inventors 
are much more likely to be resource constrained, and much less likely to have 
staff attorneys or existing relationships with outside counsel—placing the small 
inventor at a potential disadvantage in a FTF regime.  
What impact will this major patent reform have? Although there were 
years of debate prior to the passage of the AIA, there has been virtually no em-
 
 9. See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text. 
 10. In 1998, the Philippines switched to a first-to-file system, leaving the United States 
as the last country with a first-to-invent system. Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, 
World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 548 & n.38 (1998). Canada’s switch 
in 1989 is regarded as the last major industrialized nation to switch before the U.S.’s recent 
shift—a fact which we exploit for our study. 
 11. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules 
Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1313, 1331 & n.99 (2003) (noting that a FTF sys-
tem encourages an inventor “to file her patent application as early as possible” and describ-
ing the costs of patent litigation under the FTI system). Switching to FTF also harmonized 
the U.S. patent system with that of the rest of the world, arguably as required by internation-
al treaty obligations. 
 12. As we make clear in our discussion of our study, the data we used allowed us to 
compare patenting behavior of individual inventors—those inventors filing patent applica-
tions on their own behalf—versus other types of patent applicants (such as corporations, 
governments, educational institutions, and nonprofit organizations). Thus, although our dis-
cussion applies most directly to individual inventors, there will plainly be implications from 
our findings for small entities seeking patents, such as small companies or (small) non-
profits. Thus, we use the term “small inventors” to include these smaller patenting entities as 
well as individual inventors.  
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pirical work completed to date.13 In this Article we aim to correct that deficien-
cy and predict that the AIA will have a negative impact on small inventors. We 
do so by examining the effect of a very similar law change in Canada, the last 
major country preceding the United States to change to first-to-file,14 which it 
did with the Canadian Patent Act reforms that took effect in 1989.15 By exam-
ining data on over one million patents in both Canada and the United States, 
and by using sophisticated econometric methodology, we are able to estimate 
the effects of the Canadian law change.16 Like the AIA, the Canadian Patent 
Act made several other changes to patent law besides the priority rule, and we 
therefore go to some pains to establish that the results we find are due to the 
priority rule change. 
We find that the Canadian change to FTF generally harmed individual in-
ventors. One simple measure of its impact is a drop in the share of patents 
granted to individuals after the law change. However, we note that this drop 
could be due to general long-term trends (like an increase in R&D funding 
among larger entities) rather than the priority rule change itself. Thus we use a 
difference-in-difference technique,17 which allows us to address any overall 
trends by using U.S. patenting behavior as a control group. Patenting in the 
United States generally follows similar patterns to those in Canada, but the 
United States did not change its patent law around 1989.18 Thus, comparing the 
 
 13. See Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1301-05 (discussing the politics of the first-
to-invent versus first-to-file rules); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent 
System Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
425, 426 (2002) (noting the controversy surrounding proposals to switch to first-to-file). 
 14. Michael F. Martin, The End of the First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of Its 
Origin, 49 IDEA 435, 439 n.16 (2009) (explaining that after Canada’s change, the United 
States was the only country with a FTI system). 
 15. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Rela-
tion Thereto, R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 33 (Can.) (amending Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 
1985, c. P-4); see also Gregory C. Ludlow, Intellectual Property (1987-93), Part I—
Summary of Government Activity, 25 OTTAWA L. REV. 89, 103 (1993) (noting the change). 
 16. For more information on the impact of the Canadian law change, see generally 
ROBIN COSTER, FROM FIRST-TO-INVENT TO FIRST-TO-FILE: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
(2002), available at http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/ 
ARTech-19T.pdf; Philip C. Mendes da Costa, NAFTA—The Canadian Response or Why 
Does the Canadian Patent Act Keep Changing?, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 65 (1994); Blake R. Wiggs, 
Canada’s First-to-File Experience—Should the U.S. Make the Move?, 73 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 493 (1991); Shih-tse Lo & Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Does It Matter 
Who Has the Right to Patent: First-to-Invent or First-to-File? Lessons from Canada (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14926, 2009), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14926. 
 17. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 450-54 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the use and implementation of the difference-
in-difference approach in analyzing policy). 
 18. Although Canada has a much smaller population than the United States, and a cor-
respondingly smaller economy, the two economies are very “highly integrated”—for reasons 
that include geographic proximity of the Canadian population and expansive free trade 
agreements between the countries, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
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difference between the differences in individual grant rate in the United States 
and Canada will isolate the net effect of the Canadian law change. We find that 
there is a substantial decline in patents granted to individuals due to the change 
in priority rule: about a fourteen-percent drop.19 
Our findings do not augur well for small inventors in the United States. 
While the AIA differs in important ways from the Canadian law, there are 
enough similarities that we should see parallel effects.20 In addition to harming 
small inventors, some have suggested that the AIA may also encourage lower-
quality patent applications. One of the purposes of the patent document is to 
disclose information about the invention to the public: this is what a patentee 
provides in exchange for the exclusive right to make, use, and sell her inven-
tion.21 In preliminary work, we explore this potential effect of FTF in the Ca-
nadian context by performing a basic linguistic analysis of patents before and 
after the law change. We use word count, sophistication of words, and similar 
measures as proxies for how much information a patent conveys. We find no 
evidence of a substantial impact of the law change on patent quality. 
The America Invents Act changes the United States to the first-to-file sys-
tem, but fortunately there are provisions in the Act that call for studies such as 
this to help inform its implementation.22 In the rest of this Article, we detail 
why we expect the Act to be harmful to small inventors in its current form. In 
addition, we empirically estimate, for the first time, the effect of the priority 
rule on patenting behavior and patent quality. 
The balance of the Article follows in three Parts. In Part I, we detail the 
policy questions surrounding the FTI versus FTF systems, as well as discuss 
 
(NAFTA). See IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33087, UNITED STATES-
CANADA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 1 (2006). The 
United States and Canada also have similar economic sectoral components, and cross-border 
trade to the other is a major component of each country’s economy. See id. at 1, 3-8. But see 
id. at 1-6 (noting that the U.S. and Canadian economies, although similar in many respects, 
diverge in others). Although productivity in Canada is lower than in the United States—
perhaps as a result of lower capital intensity, see, e.g., Someshwar Rao et al., Measuring the 
Canada-U.S. Productivity Gap: Industry Dimensions, INT’L PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR, Fall 
2004, at 3, 13-14 (discussing the “productivity gap” and noting the contribution of capital 
intensity)—in our view, the very close economic similarities (indeed, integration) between 
the countries make the Canadian-U.S. comparison especially apt. 
 19. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 20. The most important difference is that the AIA includes a so-called “first-to-
publish” exception. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 
125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)). This means that inven-
tors have a one-year grace period from publication of an invention before they must submit 
their patent application. 
 21. See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 407-10 (2010). 
 22. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 26 (requiring a U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office study to determine the effect of the AIA “with respect to patent rights, innovation in 
the United States, competitiveness of United States markets, access by small businesses to 
capital for investment, and such other issues”). 
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the changes implemented by the America Invents Act and the Canadian Patent 
Act in greater detail. Part II introduces our datasets, obtained from the U.S. Pa-
tent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Canadian Intellectual Property Of-
fice (CIPO). In Part III we detail our empirical strategy and present the main 
results. Part III also explores some possible shortcomings of our analysis, and 
seeks to address the main objections to our results. We end with a brief Conclu-
sion with discussion of the possible policy implications and suggestions for fur-
ther research. 
I. FIRST-TO-INVENT VERSUS FIRST-TO-FILE: A PRIMER 
Patent priority is a relatively straightforward concept, determining the 
question of who, among contemporaneous inventors of a particular subject mat-
ter, is awarded the patent to that subject matter. In a perfect world, patent sys-
tems would not require such rules: inventors would work on distinct inventions, 
and receive patents on them once (or if) they had reached the substantive 
thresholds for patentability. Unfortunately, it is common for inventors to work 
on overlapping or even the same inventions, often at nearly the same time—
information is simply not available to prevent such occurrences.23 It is under 
these circumstances in which the priority rules step in, allocating the patent 
rights to single inventors (or inventive entities, in the case of joint 
inventorship). Note that regardless of how the rules allocate the patent grants, 
these circumstances are costly for both inventors and society.24 Thus, the sys-
tem of allocating priority matters—significantly.25 
To date, modern patent systems have used one of two systems for allocat-
ing priority to patent rights. The first, known as the first-to-invent system, at-
tempts to grant the rights to the inventor who can prove the earliest date of in-
vention.26 What this means is that the decisionmaking body, whether the Patent 
 
 23. The ensuing competition to obtain a patent is called a “patent race.” See, e.g., 
Drew Fudenberg et al., Preemption, Leapfrogging and Competition in Patent Races, 22 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 3, 3 (1983); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipa-
tion, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 312 (1992).  
 24. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 23, at 313. 
 25. Imagine being part of a research team that works for years (and spends millions of 
dollars) to solve a particular technological problem. Unbeknownst to the investors or re-
searchers, a similar research team was concurrently working on the same problem (and also 
spending millions of dollars). Assuming near contemporaneous development of the solution, 
the patent priority rules would then determine the winner and loser of this race, with the los-
er having not only lost the investment, but also perhaps being precluded from further closely 
related research. 
One issue that is not well known empirically is how much the priority rules matter for 
the general welfare of society. Priority rules which discourage wasteful duplication of effort 
would be beneficial. But it may be the case that the reward of a patent for priority of inven-
tion induces more rapid and sophisticated research and that the benefits outweigh the costs of 
duplicative effort. 
 26. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
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Office or the courts, must weigh various kinds of evidence relating to the in-
ventive process and its timing. The second, and dominant, approach has been 
the first-to-file system, wherein the first inventor to file his application in the 
relevant jurisdiction is awarded the patent.27 As compared to the first-to-invent 
approach, the evidentiary inquiry required for awarding priority under first-to-
file is substantially reduced—indeed, almost nonexistent. 
Both of these approaches are modified first-in-time systems. One might 
reasonably ask whether there might be a better system for allocating patent 
rights among competing inventors. For example, a system might instead grant 
the rights to the inventor best suited to commercialize the technology.28 Mi-
chael Abramowicz and John Duffy have recommended, as part of a dramatic 
rethinking of the patent prosecution process, that the first inventor to receive a 
granted patent (from among competing private patent offices, rather than from 
the centralized USPTO) be awarded priority.29 Or perhaps the patent rights 
could be auctioned or shared among closely competing inventors. For our pur-
poses, however, we do not consider these other approaches, and instead inves-
tigate the relative effects between the first-to-invent system (the historic U.S. 
system) and the first-to-file approach (used elsewhere and now in the United 
States as well, after the effective date of this portion of the AIA). 
A. First-to-Invent: U.S. and Canadian Approaches  
The U.S. patent priority system before the AIA became effective was codi-
fied at 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), which, until March 16, 2013, read in relevant part: 
 A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . before such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this 
country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed 
it. In determining priority of invention under this subsection, there shall be 
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to prac-
tice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to 
conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the 
other.30 
This section has been interpreted by the courts to mean that the patent grant 
under the FTI system was given31 to a prior inventor (who did not abandon, 
 
 27. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.  
 28. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 
20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
 29. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1541, 1606 (2009). 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 102, 102(g)(2) (2011). 
 31. Note that there were two possible procedural postures of priority contests. In the 
first—known as an “interference”—the USPTO conducted a proceeding under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(g) to determine which of those who filed applications claiming the same subject mat-
ter would receive the patent grant. In the second, during postgrant litigation, a court will de-
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suppress, or conceal the invention), if that prior inventor could show (1) a first 
reduction to practice of the invention, or (2) a first conception of the invention, 
plus reasonable diligence from that time until a time just prior to conception by 
another.32 In contrast, invention in Canada’s FTI regime was defined as the 
date that the inventor “first formulated the knowledge necessary to enable an 
ordinary skilled workman to duplicate the invention and obtain the benefits 
from it.”33 For systems basing patent priority on the date of invention, the filing 
date of the application was not determinative—though the first filer had some 
important evidentiary advantages in these proceedings.34 
In both countries, if the patent office believed that a pending patent appli-
cation overlapped with another patent or application, it was necessary for an 
adjudication to occur to determine the first inventor. On the whole, Canadian 
proceedings to determine priority were much simpler than their American 
counterparts.35  
The American FTI priority rules, as established in § 102(g), were highly 
complex, involving careful definitions of what terms such as “reduce to prac-
tice,”36 “conception,”37 and “reasonable diligence”38 meant. (Not to mention 
abandonment, suppression, or concealment.)39 In addition, there were substan-
 
termine whether the provisions of § 102(g) have been violated, and thus whether the patent is 
invalid because of a prior inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, at ch. 2300 (8th ed., 
9th rev. 2012) (describing interference proceedings). 
 32. See, e.g., Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Eaton v. Ev-
ans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577-
78 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 33. Charles P. Curphey & Norris M. Eades, Canadian Patent Practice—How Different 
Is It?, 57 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 4, 15-16 & n.45 (1975) (quoting Christiani & Nielsen v. Rice, 
[1930] S.C.R. 443, 456 (Can.)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The holding here, there-
fore, is that by the date of discovery of the invention is meant the date at which the inventor 
can prove he has first formulated, either in writing or verbally, a description which affords 
the means of making that which is invented.”). 
 34. For the American presumption in favor of the first filer under the FTI system, see 
37 C.F.R. § 41.207(a)(2) (2012) (requiring that any party seeking to prove an earlier date of 
invention bear the burden of proof), and Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1192 & n.2, 1193-
94 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For the Canadian presumption, see COSTER, supra note 16, at 7-8.  
 35. See Robert A. Wilkes, The Canadian Viewpoint: A New Perspective Bridging the 
First-to-Invent and First-to-File Worlds, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 18, 20 (1990) (explaining that the 
American interference procedure was more complex than the Canadian conflict because the 
latter “is handled on the basis of a written record only; there are no provisions for motions, 
discovery, and the like, and there is no hearing (either before the Commissioner or the Patent 
Appeal Board) in the entire process within the Patent Office”). 
 36. See, e.g., Eaton, 204 F.3d at 1097. 
 37. See, e.g., Brown, 276 F.3d at 1332; Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A., 129 F.3d 
588, 594 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 38. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 3A DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND 
INFRINGEMENT § 10.07[4][d], [f] (2012). 
 39. See Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 654-55 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
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tial evidentiary complexities: proving earlier dates of invention (typically most 
important for the later filer) required each party to bear the burden of proof, and 
in some cases, the later filer would face a heightened (“clear and convincing 
evidence”) standard.40 Further, corroborating evidence was always required in 
these areas.41 
B. First-to-File: U.S. and Canadian Approaches  
By contrast to the FTI rule, the FTF system is (relatively) simple and 
straightforward. For example, the Canadian FTF rule states: 
 The subject-matter defined by a claim in an application for a patent in 
Canada . . . must not have been disclosed  
 . . . . 
 (c) in an application for a patent that is filed in Canada by a person other 
than the applicant, and has a filing date that is before the claim date . . . .42 
There are other provisions that deal with contemporaneously filed applica-
tions claiming priority to earlier applications (or foreign applications),43 but the 
basic thrust is the same: the patent right goes to the first inventor who files her 
application with the patent office. 
However, the Canadian Patent Act recognizes a significant exception to the 
first-to-file rule. If an inventor discloses his invention to the public, he has a 
one-year grace period in which he alone can patent the disclosed material.44 
Others seeking to patent the disclosed material will be barred from patenting, as 
the material would be novelty-defeating prior art.45  
The U.S. FTF rules are similar in basic approach46: the patent grant is giv-
en to the inventor with the earliest “effective filing date,”47 but is subject to 
some additional exceptions—including a provision similar to the Canadian 
grace period which allows a later filer to win priority if she publicly disclosed 
(or caused to be publicly disclosed) her invention prior to the filing of the earli-
er application.48  
 
 40. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.207(a)(2) (2012). 
 41. Brown, 276 F.3d at 1335. 
 42. Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 § 28.2(1). 
 43. See id. § 28.2(1)(d)(i)-(iv). 
 44. See id. § 28.2(1)(a); CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST: PATENTS IV(4)(b)(ii) (4th 
ed. 2008) (describing the grace period).  
 45. See Wiggs, supra note 16, at 496-97. 
 46. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 
285-87, 293 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102) (removing rules establishing a first-to-
invent system and replacing them with a first-to-file system).  
 47. The effective filing date refers to either the filing date of the application in ques-
tion or the filing date of an earlier application from which the current application can claim 
the benefit of that earlier date. See id. 
 48. See id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)). In a sense this creates something 
of a “first to publish” system by making first disclosure an important defense against a first 
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Tucked into the disclosure exception of the AIA is a derivation clause pro-
tecting an inventor if a third party discloses his invention. Specifically, the stat-
ute states that if the disclosure derives from the work of the potential patentee it 
cannot be used as prior art against the original inventor and source of infor-
mation.49 Unfortunately, “disclosure” and “derivation” are left somewhat un-
clear in the Act.50 It is clear, however, that interference proceedings are now 
replaced with derivation proceedings.51 Derivation proceedings will allow po-
tential patentees to challenge a third-party patent on the grounds that the con-
tained subject derived from the petitioner’s patent.52 
The AIA also implements a two-track application system. For a significant 
fee, a patentee may request expedited review of her application.53 Similarly, 
Canada requires inventors to opt in to a formal examination of their patent for 
an additional fee.54 The request may be made up to five years after filing, 
though after that period, the patent is considered abandoned.55 Both Canada 
and the United States reduce fees for small entities.56  
The Canadian and American transitions from first-to-invent to first-to-file 
are, in a broad sense, identical. The first-to-invent priority rules of both nations 
were a complex jungle, aimed at seeking out the true first inventor. In their 
 
filer. Jim Longacre, 35 USC § 102 and the First to File System, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING 
ISSUES ANALYSIS, Oct. 2011, available at 2011 Emerging Issues 5978. 
 49. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(b)(1) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b)(2)). 
 50. See John E. Schneider, Leahy-Smith America Invents Act—Patent Reform 2011 Is 
Finally Here, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Sept. 2011, available at 2011 
Emerging Issues 5929.  
 51. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(i) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)) 
(“An applicant for patent may file a petition to institute a derivation proceeding in the Office. 
The petition shall set forth with particularity the basis for finding that an inventor named in 
an earlier application derived the claimed invention from an inventor named in the petition-
er’s application and, without authorization, the earlier application claiming such invention 
was filed.”). 
 52. Derivation Proceedings, SUGHRUE MION, PLLC, at 1, http://www.sughrue.com/ 
files/uploads/documents/fadi_article_derivation.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).  
 53. Edward Fan & Karen Townsend, United States Converts to First-to-File Patent 
System, TORYS LLP 1-2 (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/ 
Publication%20PDFs/IP2011-4.pdf (explaining that the current fee for prioritized review for 
large-entity applicants is set at $4800). 
 54. See Tariff of Fees—Patents, CAN. INTELL. PROP. OFF., http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ 
cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00142.html (last modified Jan. 2, 2013).  
 55. How Your Patent Application Is Processed, CAN. INTELL. PROP. OFF., 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr03002.html (last modified 
Apr. 4, 2011). 
 56. See David Black, Size Matters Under the America Invents Act, PAT. REFORUM 
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://americainventsact.com/size-matters-under-the-america-invents-act 
(explaining that “for many years” small entities benefited from a fee reduction of 50% and 
that the AIA increases the fee reduction for microentities to 75%); Tariff of Fees, supra note 
54 (describing the two-track fee structure for small and large entities for reexamination re-
quests). 
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transition to first-to-file, both nations retained a flavor of the FTI system 
through a disclosure exception.  
As a statute, the AIA remains unclear. Numerous commentaries speak to 
the potential complexities and statutory ambiguities.57 Only as courts work 
through the AIA’s challenges and contours will we definitively know its scope 
and content. However, these details and intricacies pale in comparison to the 
broad-based structural change inherent in the AIA.  
C. The Policy of Patent Priority Rules 
There are a variety of important policy questions related to a shift to a first-
to-file system, including issues of efficiency and international harmonization.58 
The policy question we address here is whether a first-to-file system discrimi-
nates against individual inventors, small businesses, or nonprofits, rendering 
them less likely to obtain effective patent protection than larger organiza-
tions.59 (A weaker version of this question is whether the U.S. first-to-invent 
system could favor such entities.)60 The suggestion is that a first-to-invent sys-
tem—which necessarily allows a later applicant to obtain the patent rights to an 
invention first claimed in an earlier application by another inventor—permits 
those with fewer resources (e.g., individuals, small business, and nonprofits) to 
obtain patent protection without the need to “rush” to the door of the patent of-
fice.61 There are good reasons to believe that organizations with more resources 
will be, on balance, more able to file patent applications quickly. At the sim-
plest level, the cost of patenting is likely to be less of a concern for larger or-
ganizations.62 Further, additional resources allow more patent attorneys or 
 
 57. See Eric E. Bensen, America Invents Act, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, 
Sept. 2011, available at 2011 Emerging Issues 5900; Longacre, supra note 48; Donald S. 
Chisum, America Invents Act of 2011: Analysis and Cross-References (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.chisum.com/wp-content/uploads/AIAOverview.pdf; Donald S. Chisum, Priority 
Among Competing Patent Applicants Under the American Invents Act (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969592. 
 58. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing policy implications of 
FTI versus FTF); see also Robert W. Pritchard, The Future Is Now—The Case for Patent 
Harmonization, 20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 291, 300 (1995). 
 59. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, Introduction to Symposium, The Harmonization of 
International Patent Law, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 447-48 (1993); Lemley & Chien, 
supra note 11, at 1304-05. 
 60. See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The First-to-Invent Rule in the U.S. Patent Sys-
tem Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
514, 515 (2005) (updating earlier work).  
 61. See, e.g., Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 267 (1995) (“Independent inventors, who are often the backbone of 
new companies, will be especially vulnerable against large multinational corporations who 
can afford to mount continuing legal challenges.”). 
 62. The most recent statistics available from the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association suggests that on average filing a patent application of low complexity costs 
about $7000, and that filing a patent of relative complexity costs between $9000 and 
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agents to be dedicated to drafting and filing applications. The inventors in larg-
er organizations may be more able to redirect the time that would otherwise be 
required by the patent application process toward their other duties. Larger or-
ganizations may have routinized patenting procedures, designed to yield rapid 
applications. Smaller organizations and individuals, with constrained patenting 
resources, may wish to wait until the commercial potential of an invention is 
clearer prior to filing. Each of these factors, and likely several more, at mini-
mum raises a serious question about the effect on individual inventors and 
small businesses of a change to the first-to-file system. 
It is important to understand, however, that the rules of patent priority are 
far from the only set of incentives operating on a putative patentee’s decision 
on whether to patent, and when. Indeed, while the first-to-invent system may at 
first glance seem to have encouraged waiting to apply for a patent (or at least 
not penalized it substantially),63 the rules themselves did the opposite. For ex-
ample, the first applicant in a priority contest (known as the “senior party”) 
gained a de facto presumption that he is the first inventor, forcing the later filer 
(the “junior party”) to present proof of an earlier invention date.64 Furthermore, 
other critical patent rules, most prominently those related to prior art, strongly 
encouraged an early filing—simply, the earlier the filing date, the less prior art 
would be available.65 Thus, while the first-to-invent rules offered an important 
benefit to later patent applicants, their incentive effect is likely to be muted by 
other countervailing incentives built into the patent system. 
On the other hand, it is clear that the patent priority rules do matter signifi-
cantly. Several scholars have analyzed the results of priority contests under 
former 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) and found that junior parties—later filers of applica-
tions—win over forty percent of the time, a somewhat surprising number, given 
the evidentiary advantages given to the first applicants.66 Interestingly, the size 
of the parties seems to have relatively little effect on the win rates in priority 
contests.67 
Priority rules may have a substantial impact for another reason: the deter-
mination of what is included in “prior art.” Under the FTI system, a person 
could lose the right to a patent if the invention was known, used, or described 
in print before the claimed date of invention.68 Under a first-to-file system, the 
 
$12,000. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25 
(2009); see also Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1309-14 
(2009) (discussing the sensitivity of startups to the costs of patenting and enforcement). 
 63. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2011). 
 64. See id.  
 65. See, e.g., id. § 102(a), (b). 
 66. See Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1309 (reporting that junior parties won for-
ty-three percent of the time based on a sample population of 100 cases). 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 1321-22; Mossinghoff, supra note 60, at 517-18. 
 68. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
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key date becomes not the date of invention, but the filing date. Because a filing 
date will obviously be later than an invention date, this expands the period of 
time during which there could be invalidating prior art available and thus re-
duces the likelihood of validity. This is another mechanism by which the 
change in priority system may affect the worth of a patent, but with the same 
impact: that the expected value on the date of invention is likely to be dimin-
ished. 
This question has more than distributional import. Although it is clear that 
the rate of individual patenting has been decreasing in the United States over 
time,69 it is widely believed that individuals and small entities have an im-
portant impact on the innovation ecosystem—perhaps an outsized impact.70 
This is for several reasons. First, there is some evidence that the inventions 
from smaller entities are more likely to be disruptive in nature, moving the pace 
of technological change forward.71 Second, in some industries, such as high 
technology and pharmaceuticals, small companies and individuals serve as im-
portant innovation inputs into larger, established companies.72 Finally, even if 
small entities are no more effective than their larger counterparts at innovation, 
the distribution of patent rights—and thus marketplace power—has important 
consequences. 
This is not to suggest that we have a firm view on the value of innovations 
by individuals and small firms versus large companies, or that we take a posi-
tion regarding the wisdom of the change in the United States to a first-to-file 
rule. Our point here is to note that there is some evidence to suggest that if the 
first-to-file rules indeed disproportionately impact small entities, that could 
have important effects on innovation. In short, this is an important policy 
change that appears to have potential impact on long-term innovation. 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN 
As the foregoing suggests, there is a need to empirically investigate one of 
the major (if not the major) claims related to the shift from first-to-invent to 
first-to-file in the United States: that the change will adversely affect the patent-
 
 69. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT: JANUARY 1, 
1986—DECEMBER 31, 2010, at A2-1 (2011). 
 70. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 910-11 
(2002); Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45 
HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1202-03 (2008). 
 71. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 131-34 (3d 
ed. 1950) (discussing the stationary state that would result without entrepreneurs); see also 
ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 3-10 & tbl.1-1 (1988). 
 72. See ZOLTAN J. ACS & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS 1-8, 
147-54 (1990); CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM 
CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNICAL CHANGE (2003); see also, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., 
Knowledge Spillovers and Patent Citations: Evidence from a Survey of Inventors, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. 215, 218 (2000). 
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Year 1989
Distribution of Patent Grants by Technology Class
USA Canada
ing behavior of individuals and small entities, as compared to larger organiza-
tions. An obvious obstacle in conducting this investigation is the fact that the 
United States has just changed its priority rules, so there is no way to directly 
compare the U.S. first-to-invent system with the first-to-file system found in 
the America Invents Act. 
Although the United States had not undertaken a change in priority rules 
until now, the most recent such shift in a highly-developed country occurred in 
Canada in 1989, and this law change offers an opportunity for empirical inves-
tigation. Canada has a patent system very similar to that of the United States, 
has similar economic features to the United States, close geographic proximity, 
and a similar innovation environment to the United States—making it a good 
control.73 Since the focus of this Article is patenting behavior, in order for the 
United States to serve as a good control group, a similar patenting environment 
is critical. Figure 1 shows the share of patents by technology category in the 
United States and Canada. As can be seen, there is a strong correlation between 
the shares of technology classes in the United States and in Canada. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Our basic research strategy is to exploit the 1989 change from first-to-
invent to first-to-file in Canada as a means to get insights into what impact that 
shift in the United States might have. Specifically, we investigate how the law 
 
73.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
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change affected the patenting behavior of individual inventors relative to larger 
entities. 
However, simply comparing the patenting behavior of Canadian individual 
inventors before and after the law change allows only limited insight into the 
question. For example, one would not be able to rule out the possibility that any 
change in activity was related to an array of other factors, for example, changes 
in the macroeconomy. Thus, we need a control group to help isolate the effect 
of the Canadian law change. For this we use the United States. Since the United 
States did not change its priority rules during the time of the Canadian law 
change, and given the similarities between the U.S. and Canadian patent sys-
tems (not to mention economies), the United States serves as a good control. 
The research design we employ is a modern econometric technique known as a 
difference-in-difference analysis,74 which is used to control for effects other 
than the priority rule change. By comparing the observed differences in indi-
vidual patenting behavior in Canada across the 1989 change in the law to the 
differences in individual patenting behavior in the United States during the 
same time period, we can isolate the effect of the law change on individual pa-
tenting behavior in Canada. 
The difference-in-difference technique is aimed at closely approximating 
the ideal scientific experiment, with treatment and control groups. In this case, 
Canada is the treated group, since it had the change in priority rule. Ideally, one 
would compare it to an identical country (the control group) that did not have 
such a change. In this study, we use the United States as the control group, 
since it is similar in many important ways to Canada, and did not have a priori-
ty rule change at the same time. By comparing the change in Canada with the 
change in the United States, we can cleanly detect the effect of just the law 
change, and not other spurious effects, such as those related to global changes 
in innovation.75  
A. The Canadian Law Change 
In 1986, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Mat-
ters in Relation Thereto was introduced in Canada.76 The bill passed the House 
of Commons on May 6, 1987, and the Senate on November 19, 1987. The law 
changes became effective on October 1, 1989. Patent applications filed prior to 
 
 74. See, e.g., JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS 
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 227-43 (2009). 
 75. A good control group must be similar to the treatment group in the absence of the 
treatment. In this case, given the similarity of the economies and innovation in the two coun-
tries, we believe the United States satisfies the requirements of a good control. 
 76. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Rela-
tion Thereto, R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 33 (Can.). 
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October 1, 1989, were processed under the FTI rules, while applications after 
that date were processed under the new rules.77 
For our purposes here, the important change was the shift in Canada from a 
FTI system to the current FTF system noted above. Prior to the enactment of 
the changes in 1989, Canada’s patent priority system was similar to the U.S. 
FTI system, including a procedure (called a “conflict proceeding”) to sort out 
the priority of co-pending applications.78 
The 1987 patent reform act also included other important changes to Cana-
dian patent law, several of which we discuss in detail below. For one, the pa-
tentability of pharmaceutical drugs was confirmed.79 For another, the patent 
term was changed from seventeen years from the date of issue to twenty years 
from the date of filing.80 The law also introduced a deferred examination pro-
cess whereby applicants can file applications but request that the CIPO not 
begin examining them until some time later, now as much as five years later.81 
And finally, maintenance fees were introduced, requiring annual payments by 
both applicants and grantees to maintain their applications and patents, respec-
tively.82 
B. Prior Literature on Priority Rules 
Most prior studies investigating the effect of the first-to-file system in the 
United States have been based on data gathered from “interference” proceed-
ings—the complex system implementing the first-inventor priority rules found 
in 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). In general, these studies have documented little if any 
impact related to entity size in the former first-to-invent system. For example, 
Gerald Mossinghoff found no evidence that small entities are advantaged by 
the FTI system, and indeed concluded that in some ways small entities in the 
United States were disadvantaged by the FTI system.83 Specifically, he gath-
ered data on interference proceedings from 1983 to 2004 and found that small 
entities took advantage of the FTI system (by winning an interference contest 
despite filing an application second) slightly less often (286 times) than the 
 
 77. See id. §§ 8-10. 
 78. See ROGER T. HUGHES & JOHN H. WOODLEY, HUGHES AND WOODLEY ON PATENTS 
595 (1984) (describing the Canadian first-to-invent system). 
 79. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Rela-
tion Thereto § 6.  
 80. See id. § 16. 
 81. See id. § 12. What was initially a seven-year window was reduced to five years in 
1992. 
 82. See id. § 16. 
 83. Specifically, he argued that interference proceedings, which were complex and 
lengthy, favored larger entities. See Mossinghoff, supra note 60, at 520. Mark Lemley and 
Colleen Chien confirmed in their study that large entities initiated interference proceedings 
more than small entities and reached a similar conclusion. See Lemley & Chien, supra note 
11, at 1323. 
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number of times that such entities were disadvantaged (289 times) by the FTI 
system (by losing an interference contest despite filing first).84 Breaking the 
results out by type of entity, he found that individual inventors in particular 
gained no advantage from the FTI system, and rather were disadvantaged about 
10% more often than they were advantaged by the system.85 In a 2002 study, 
covering the time period 1983 to 2000, Mossinghoff obtained similar results.86 
In their article entitled Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Neces-
sary?, Mark Lemley and Colleen Chien empirically analyzed the results of in-
terference proceedings and court cases involving patent priority in the United 
States. They found that the first applicant—the senior party—was usually, but 
by no means always, the first inventor. Indeed, they found that just over 40% of 
the time, the junior party won the priority contest, though they did identify a 
significant difference between outcomes in cases litigated before the Federal 
Circuit and decisions by district courts and the USPTO’s Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interferences.87 Thus, they concluded that, contrary to some scholarly 
discussion, the priority rules for patents do actually matter significantly.88 
Lemley and Chien also investigated the grounds on which the victors in the 
priority contests succeeded and concluded that in a large majority of cases 
(67% to 76% depending on the party type), the showing of a first reduction to 
practice is the grounds for victory.89 This is a somewhat surprising result, given 
the complexity of the priority rules—only rarely do parties win on the basis of 
earlier conception, or the lack of diligence of the other party, or abandonment, 
suppression, or concealment.90 Lemley and Chien argued, therefore, that the 
priority rules could be greatly streamlined, eliminating much of the complexity 
and cost, without changing the results in the cases very much.91 
While Lemley and Chien did not themselves try to determine whether the 
FTI system benefited or harmed small entities or individual inventors, they ar-
gued that their findings were consistent with Mossinghoff’s suggestion that the 
system did not greatly benefit these groups.92 In particular, as noted above, 
they found that large entities were more likely to initiate interference proceed-
ings, suggesting that “[i]f anything, small entities are getting bogged down in 
interference proceedings initiated by larger companies.”93 They also argued 
that their basic findings—that first inventors are sometimes the last to file—
 
 84. Mossinghoff, supra note 60, at 517. 
 85. See id. at 519 & fig.5 ((167 − 139) ⁄ (167 + 139) = 0.0915). 
 86. See Mossinghoff, supra note 13, at 430. 
 87. Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1309. 
 88. See id. at 1308; cf. Peter A. Jackman, Adoption of a First-to-File Patent System: A 
Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 67, 84 (1997). 
 89. Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1315. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 1318-19. 
 92. Id. at 1323. 
 93. Id. 
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would not much change under a first-to-file system: the extra incentives to file 
more quickly should apply, they said, across categories of inventors, so there is 
little reason to think that first inventors would themselves be more likely to file 
early.94 We are not so sure this makes intuitive sense.  
Assume there is variation in the cost to file quickly (e.g., hiring attorneys, 
preparing the patent application, etc.) for different types of inventors. When the 
filing date is irrelevant, this heterogeneous cost will not impact filing dates very 
much—other considerations or just random variation will determine filing 
dates, leading to no systematic difference in filing dates across the types of in-
ventors under a FTI system. A change to FTF would substantially increase the 
incentives for both types of inventors to file early. This would be much cheaper 
for the low-cost inventors to achieve, and thus we would expect to see more pa-
tents filed sooner by this class, which we assert, corresponds well to large  
corporations.  
Thus, the major empirical analyses related to the former FTI priority sys-
tem in the United States are limited in their ability to answer the question of 
whether the system helps or hurts individual inventors and small entities. First, 
by relying on data related to actual priority contests, these studies only tell us 
what happened when there was a significant claim that a first inventor was the 
last to file.95 That is, they do not measure the effects that the FTI system versus 
the FTF system might have on the basic incentives to file for patents. Second, 
although Lemley and Chien do not read their study this way, some of their re-
sults do seem to challenge Mossinghoff’s premise that the FTI system is not 
beneficial to small entities. First, the very fact that the FTI system matters—
that the first inventorship rules of priority do indeed drive the results in a sub-
stantial minority of cases—together with the arguments that individuals and 
small businesses are somewhat less likely on the margin to file quickly, lends 
some weight to the suggestion that small entities were favored under the FTI 
system. Second, the relative simplicity of the priority contests, typically only 
requiring a showing of an earlier date of reduction to practice, suggests that the 
complexity of the FTI system was not a disproportionate burden on small enti-
ties. Thus, we think it is safe to say that most of the research to date does not 
offer much information on the effect of the first-to-invent rule, especially with 
respect to entity size—which is perhaps the primary argument in policy circles 
right now. 
In addition to these U.S. studies, there is one interesting study that takes a 
similar—though not identical—approach to the one we conduct here. In Does It 
Matter Who Has the Right to Patent: First-to-Invent or First-to-File? Lessons 
 
 94.  Id. at 1313. 
 95. Both interference proceedings and litigation (the two venues by which a priority 
contest can be resolved) are extremely expensive and thus involve only a very small fraction 
of all patents; therefore, when a priority contest does actually occur, the stakes must be sub-
stantial. 
WAGNER & ABRAMS 65 STAN. L. REV. 517.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2013 4:08 PM 
536 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:517 
from Canada, Shih-tse Lo and Dhanoos Sutthiphisal investigated whether the 
Canadian law change in 1989—from FTI to FTF—had a measurable impact on 
innovative output in Canada.96 By comparing industry-level inventive activity 
between Canada and the United States, they concluded that the change to FTF 
had a “small negative impact.”97 Lo and Sutthiphisal focused their analysis on 
the years 1983 to 1994, seeking to avoid entangling their results with other pos-
sible policy changes in the United States or Canada.98 Using patent counts as a 
measure of inventive output, their model attempted to explore the differences in 
output per R&D inputs in 1983 (under the FTI system) and 1994 (under the 
FTF system).99 They also used Americans who sought patents in Canada as a 
baseline comparator, arguing that Americans’ inventive activity would be less 
impacted by the Canadian FTF reforms than would domestic inventors’.100 Fi-
nally, they also looked at Canadian patent filings abroad (in the United States 
and Europe) to account for other changes in the 1989 reforms, most especially 
the inclusion of maintenance fees.101 In general, they found relatively little im-
pact on patenting behavior attributed to the change to FTF in 1989.102 They 
did, however, find that Canadian small businesses and individuals patented less 
in the United States after the law change, implying a decrease in inventive ac-
tivity.103 Thus, they tentatively concluded that the changes in the law seemed to 
channel patenting behavior towards larger businesses.104 
C. Data Used in This Study 
In order to empirically investigate the impact of the first-to-file priority 
rule, we obtained bibliographic data on granted patents from the Canadian In-
tellectual Property Office (CIPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO).105 For both datasets we focus on applications filed during the 
 
 96. Lo & Sutthiphisal, supra note 16, at 4-5. 
 97. Id. at 5. 
 98. Id. at 10-11.  
 99. Id. at 11-13. 
100. Id. at 15. 
101. Id. at 16-17. 
102. Id. at 22-23. 
103. Id. at 26. Although Lo and Sutthiphisal used Canadian patenting in the United 
States as their measure in order to avoid picking up effects related to the maintenance fees, 
their result seems equally explained by the rise in costs of Canadian patenting as a result of 
the new fees. That is, larger entities can expect to see a shift in patenting in their direction 
when the costs of patenting rise, and since many Canadian inventors file both in the United 
States and Canada, increases in the costs of patenting in Canada will likely have a similar 
effect on the costs of patenting—to Canadian companies—in the United States. 
104. Id. at 27.  
105. Canadian data are available in bulk form from CIPO. See IP Data Products, CAN. 
INTELL. PROP. OFF., http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/ 
h_wr01933.html (last modified Dec. 14, 2012). The U.S. data are available in bulk form 
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period from 1984 to 1993.106 This period is chosen to allow a long enough 
timespan to detect changes in patenting behavior due to the law change, but not 
so long that long-term trends and other changes are likely to introduce excess 
noise into the data.107 The U.S. and Canadian datasets are similar, and both in-
clude information on application date, patent grant date, inventor, assignee, pa-
tent number, number and word count of claims, and technology classification. 
One significant difference between the two datasets is the size: there are 
163,464 patents in the Canadian data and 890,344 in the U.S. data. While the 
total number of patents granted in the United States is over five times that of 
Canada, the disparity goes in the other direction when normalizing for country 
size or GDP. Using 1990 populations,108 there were 6.32 patents granted per 
1000 Canadians and 3.59 patents per 1000 Americans.109 Additionally, through 
the ten-year period of the data, there were 294 patents granted in Canada per 
billion dollars (1989 U.S. dollars) of annual GDP compared with 162 patent 
grants in the United States per billion dollars of annual GDP.110 
Because the focus of this investigation is the impact of the priority rule on 
what types of entities are granted patents, it is crucial to have a clear definition 
of an individual patentee.111 In both the Canadian and U.S. data, inventors must 
be individuals, but assignees can be individuals or corporations. There can be 
multiple inventors and assignees in both datasets. In the Canadian data, we de-
fine a patent as having a corporate inventor—and thus not an individual patent-
ee—if at least one of the assignees as of the grant date is not also an inventor. 
This is because in the Canadian dataset, individual inventors are also listed as-
signees, in addition to any corporate assignees. 
The U.S. data is easier to classify, due to additional data made available by 
the USPTO.112 A “small entity status” field is included with that dataset that 
includes a classification of the type of assignee entity. We create a binary vari-
 
from the USPTO. See Electronic Data Products, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/products/catalog/index.jsp (last modified Jan. 2, 2013). 
106. For both datasets, the application date is the actual filing date of the patent applica-
tion. 
107. Some specifications use shorter time periods in order to focus even more precisely 
on the 1989 law change. 
108. See Estimated Population of Canada, 1605 to Present, STAT. CANADA, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/98-187-x/4151287-eng.htm (last modified July 6, 2009); 1990 
Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen1990.html (last modi-
fied Oct. 15, 2012). 
109. Note that these are total patents granted in each country, regardless of country of 
origin of patentee or inventor. One important reason for the higher per capita grant rate in 
Canada is that a much greater proportion of Canadian patents are granted to non-Canadians. 
110. GDP data are available at the International Monetary Fund website. World Eco-
nomic Outlook Databases, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/ns/ 
cs.aspx?id=28 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).  
111. All assignment data for both countries are as of the patent issue date. 
112. Ideally we would compare similarly defined small entities or individuals across the 
two datasets. Unfortunately, the CIPO does not include such classifications with the data. 
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able that is assigned a value of 1 if the assignee type is an individual. In order 
to make the coding comparable with the Canadian data, we also use a second 
definition for the U.S. dataset. For this variable, we define an individual inven-
tor as one that has a missing assignee name, implying that no assignment has 
been made as of the grant and thus the inventor is likely an individual.113 The 
two definitions we use for U.S. data disagree less than one time in 1000  
observations. 
With these definitions in place, it is useful to compare the base rates of as-
signment to individuals during the time period studied. In Canada, 9.9% of pa-
tents are granted to individuals, while this rate is 16.9% in the United States. 
Among domestic inventors, though, the pattern is reversed, with 36.4% of Ca-
nadian patents granted to Canadians going to individuals, while in the United 
States 23.2% of American entities receiving patents are individuals. The higher 
overall rate of individuals in the U.S. data may therefore reflect the greater pro-
portion that domestic patentees comprise, differences in variable definition in 
the two datasets, the impact in Canada of the priority rule change, or other fac-
tors. What is much more important for the purposes of our analysis is that the 
variables are relatively stable over time or trend in the same way. We examine 
this shortly.  
Another way to compare inventive activity in the United States and in Can-
ada is by looking at the country of origin of inventors and assignees. In Table 1, 
we see that U.S. inventors make up nearly 50% of Canadian patent grantees, 
followed by Japanese inventors with 15%. Canadian inventors are fourth in 
their country, with about 7% of the total. The pattern in the United States is 
similar (Table 2), with U.S. inventors comprising just over half of granted pa-
tentees. This is followed by Japanese inventors, who make up 21%. Canadian 
inventors account for 2% of the U.S. patent grants, but were actually granted 
about 38% more patents in the United States (17,805) than in Canada (12,944). 
In both countries, inventors from five large European nations (Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Italy) together comprise many 
of the remaining inventors. The distribution of the home country of top assign-
ees (not reported in the article) is very similar to that for inventors. 
 
113. For consistency with the Canadian data, this second definition is used in the results 
presented in this Article. 
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TABLE 1 
Top Twenty-Five Countries by Inventor Submitting Granted  
Canadian Patent Applications, 1984-1993 
 
Country of First Inventor Number of Patents 
Granted from 1984-1993 
Percentage of Total 
United States 80,332 49.14 
Japan 23,829 14.58 
Germany 12,186 7.45 
Canada 12,055 7.37 
France 8598 5.26 
United Kingdom 7123 4.36 
Switzerland 3154 1.93 
Italy 2813 1.72 
Netherlands 2683 1.64 
Sweden 2108 1.29 
Australia 1296 0.79 
Finland 1163 0.71 
Belgium 1098 0.67 
Austria 830 0.51 
Denmark 562 0.34 
Israel 409 0.25 
Norway 387 0.24 
Unknown 364 0.22 
South Africa 337 0.21 
Hungary 266 0.16 
Spain 250 0.15 
Soviet Union 209 0.13 
Republic of Korea 190 0.12 
New Zealand 168 0.10 
Luxembourg 131 0.08 
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TABLE 2 
Top Twenty-Five Countries by Inventor Submitting Granted  
U.S. Patent Applications, 1984-1993 
 
Country of First Inventor Number of Patents 
Granted from 1984-1993 
Percentage of Total 
United States 475,003 53.35 
Japan 190,910 21.44 
Germany 71,120 7.99 
France 27,672 3.11 
United Kingdom 25,378 2.85 
Canada 17,781 2.00 
Switzerland 12,206 1.37 
Italy 11,696 1.31 
Netherlands 8775 0.99 
Sweden 7552 0.85 
Taiwan 7474 0.84 
Australia 4269 0.48 
Republic of Korea 4236 0.48 
Austria 3443 0.39 
Belgium  3259 0.37 
Israel 3004 0.34 
Finland 2875 0.32 
Denmark 1906 0.21 
Spain 1319 0.15 
Norway 1160 0.13 
Soviet Union 1047 0.12 
South Africa 1044 0.12 
Hungary 871 0.10 
Unknown 733 0.08 
Hong Kong 537 0.06 
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A list of top corporate patentees (by assignee name) includes some of the 
best-known companies in the world for both U.S. and Canadian patents (see 
Tables 3 and 4, below). General Electric (GE), International Business Machines 
(IBM), Canon, Toshiba, and DuPont are among the firms granted the most pa-
tents in both countries. Within the top 100 nonindividual patentees in the Unit-
ed States,114 there are a few entities that do not qualify as corporations: parts of 
the federal government or military and a university (MIT). In the Canadian da-
ta, a few erroneous top assignees result from data entry errors,115 along with the 
Canadian military, the National Research Council of Canada, and four individ-
uals (Jean-Francois Grollier,116 David T. Green,117 Robert C. Berfield,118 and 
Josef Pedain119).  
 
114. A list of these companies and the corresponding number of patent applications is 
available from the authors. 
115. These include “Co.,” “Company,” “Co. KG,” “Co-Conn,” “Co. Inc.,” and “Sons 
Inc.” 
116. Grollier is a chemist who has directed R&D for L’Oreal since 1994. Jean-Francois 
Grollier: Executive Profile, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/ 
research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=8155200 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
117. Green holds patents on medical technologies. See Patents Related to David T. 
Green, GOOGLE PATS., http://patents.google.com (search for “David T. Green”). 
118. Berfield holds vacuum cleaner-related patents. See Patents Related to Robert C. 
Berfield, GOOGLE PATS., http://patents.google.com (search for “Robert C. Berfield”). 
119. Pedain holds chemical coatings patents. See Patents Related to Josef Pedain, 
GOOGLE PATS., http://patents.google.com (search for “Josef Pedain”). 
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TABLE 3 
Top Companies by Number of Granted  
Canadian Patent Applications, 1984-1993 
 
Company Name Number of Patents 
from 1984-1993 
General Electric Company 235 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company 215 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company 180 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company 172 
Sony Corporation 168 
NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken 167 
International Business Machines Corporation 158 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation 150 
Shell Canada Limited 149 
NEC Corporation 142 
The Dow Chemical Company 127 
Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft 118 
Ciba-Geigy AG 116 
Gamble Company 110 
Eastman Kodak Company 105 
Union Carbide Corporation 96 
Dow Corning Corporation 78 
Exxon Research and Engineering Company 77 
RCA Corporation 76 
General Motors Corporation 72 
Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha 71 
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha 70 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 69 
American Cyanamid Company 67 
Unilever PLC 67 
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TABLE 4 
Top Companies by Number of Granted  
U.S. Patent Applications, 1984-1993 
 
Company Name Number of Patents 
from 1984-1993 
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha 9189 
Hitachi Ltd. 8986 
Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba 8342 
General Electric Company 7769 
International Business Machines Corporation 7210 
Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha 7104 
Eastman Kodak Company 6409 
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. 6122 
Motorola Inc. 5333 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. 4693 
NEC Corporation 4692 
U.S. Philips Corporation 4529 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 4446 
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 4075 
Sony Corporation 3978 
Xerox Corporation 3763 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company 3662 
General Motors Corporation 3643 
Fujitsu Limited 3594 
The Dow Chemical Company 3524 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. 3400 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company 3341 
Texas Instruments Incorporated 3312 
Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha 3225 
BASF Aktiengesellschaft 3156 
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III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
As described in Part II above, we use the Canadian change to the patent 
priority rules as a natural experiment in order to understand its relative impact 
on individual inventors. In order to control for contemporaneous changes that 
could also affect innovative activity, we use the United States as a control 
group. The United States is chosen because of its geographic proximity, eco-
nomic similarity, and close economic ties. 
A. The Rate of Patenting in the United States and Canada 
For an experiment to be a clean one, it is helpful for there to be a sharp dis-
continuity in the treated group and none (or a much smaller one) in the control 
group. One measure of innovative activity in a country is the rate of patent ap-
plications. Figures 2 and 3 report these rates for Canada and the United States 
for the period from 1984 to 1993. There is a substantial difference in the time 
series of patent applications in the two countries. 
 
FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2, in Canada, between the beginning of 1984 and mid-
1989, the number of subsequently granted applications was relatively stable at 
around 1700 per month. After a brief spike to 3400 patents in the month imme-
diately before the law change on October 1, 1989, the rate dropped to less than 
1000 per month, which remained roughly stable (with a slight decline) through 
1993. This is in sharp contrast to the pattern in U.S. patent applications, where 
there was a fairly steady increase in subsequently granted applications from 
6000 per month in 1984 to around 9000 in 1993. In Part III.D.3 below, we dis-
cuss further our view on the primary cause of the large overall drop in applica-
tions—the introduction of deferred examination as part of the 1989 law 
change.120 For now, we take this as evidence of the substantial impact of the 
 
120. As discussed in more detail in Part III.D.3 below, we believe we can rule out any 
disproportionate impact on individual inventors related to the drop in the rate of patenting. 
For example, we control for potential differences in patenting rate due to variation in repre-
sentation of individuals by technology class. We do so by running regressions including 
terms for technology class interacted with a post-law change dummy variable and find that 
the impact of the law change on individual share is still significantly negative. If the entire 
reason for the drop in Canadian patents was explained by some classes being negatively im-
pacted by the law change, and these were just the classes that had the highest individual in-
ventor representation, then there should be no overall effect of the post dummy. In fact, we 
find it to be statistically significant and a large negative value. 
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1989 law change and examine its effect on individual versus corporate inven-
tors. 
B. The Effect of First-to-File: Individual Versus Corporate Inventors 
The most compelling evidence for the impact of the first-to-file rule on 
small inventors is a visual difference in difference. The traditional difference in 
difference subtracts the change in the control group from the change in the 
treated group. In this case, the results are so stark that it is easily seen by the 
visual comparison in Figure 4, which reports the representation of individual 
inventors in the United States and Canada. In Figure 4 we see a sharp decline in 
the fraction of individual inventors, from 10.7% prior to the end of 1989 to 
7.8% afterward. During the same period in the United States, the proportion of 
individual inventors dropped slightly, from 17.4% to 16.5%. 
 
FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The numerical results from the difference in difference are reported in Ta-
ble 5. We see that both the United States and Canada experienced a decline in 
the fraction of individual inventors following the Canadian law change. This 
likely represents a long-term increase in the amount of innovation occurring 
under corporate auspices. But importantly, the magnitude of the decline is 
about three times greater in Canada than in the United States. This is also rela-
tive to a lower baseline share of individual inventors; so in percentage terms, 
the decline in Canada is almost 25%, compared to about 5% in the United 
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States. The net effect of the law is reported in the bottom right hand corner of 
Table 5. The proportion of individual inventors in Canada declined 1.5 percent-
age points more than the decline in the United States following the Canadian 
law change. This result is statistically significant at well below the 1% level.121 
 
TABLE 5 
Difference in Difference: Individual Inventor Representation 
 
 Before After After − Before  
United States 0.1734 0.1639 -0.0095 
 (0.00056)** (0.00056)** (0.00079)** 
Canada 0.1077 0.0832 -0.0245 
 (0.00088)** (0.00118)** (0.00156)** 
Canada − United States -0.0657 
(0.00117)** 
-0.0807 
(0.00168)** 
-0.0150 
(0.00205)** 
Cells indicate fraction of patents granted to individuals, with standard errors in 
parentheses. “Before” is prior to October 1, 1989, the effective date of the change of 
Canadian priority rule from first-to-invent to first-to-file.  
* indicates significance at p < 0.05  
** indicates significance at p < 0.01 
 
To make these results more precise, and allow for control variables, we run 
a regression of the form 
  
 IICt = α + βC + γ * postt + δC * postt + ϵCt (1) 
 
where IICt is the fraction of individual inventors in the data in Country C at time 
t. We code C as 1 for Canada and 0 for the United States and thus β is the Ca-
nadian fixed effect. We code postt as 1 if the application was filed after the ef-
fective date and 0 before, and thus γ captures any overall before-after effect (in 
some specifications, a linear time trend is also included). The coefficient of in-
terest is δ, which is the difference-in-difference estimate. 
The results from estimating this equation by ordinary least squares regres-
sion are reported in the first column of Table 6. This result replicates what we 
have already seen in Table 5, a reduction of about 1.5 percentage points in the 
fraction of individual inventors after the effective date of the first-to-file 
rule.122 The other columns report results from additional regressions. In column 
2, rather than the using the effective date to define the before and after periods, 
 
121. Ideally we would like to examine relative application rates of individuals and larg-
er entities, in addition to grant rates, but application data are not available in Canada prior to 
the law change. 
122. Reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent (White Standard Errors).  
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we use the date of bill passage, November 19, 1987. The figures indicate that 
not much occurred around this date, but this specification is included for com-
pleteness. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on the interaction term is substan-
tially smaller, although still statistically significant.  
 
TABLE 6 
Effect of Priority Rule on Fraction of Individual Inventors 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
 
Base 
Specification 
(2) 
 
Date of 
Passage 
(3) 
 
Linear Time 
Trend 
(4) 
 
Year 
Dummies 
(5) 
 
IPC Class 
Controls 
(6) 
Probit 
Marginal 
Effects 
(7) 
 
 
Counts 
After (γ) -0.00956 -0.00574 -0.0107 -0.0095 -0.00623 -0.0091 254.1 
 (0.000794)** (0.000856)** (0.00140)** (0.00253)** (0.000741)** (0.000754)** (25.98)** 
Canada (β) -0.0657 -0.0659 -0.0657 -0.0654 -0.0529 -0.0642 -952.7 
 (0.00105)** (0.00130)** (0.00105)** (0.00105)** (0.00101)** (0.00100)** (21.81)** 
After * Canada  -0.0149 -0.00453 -0.0149 -0.0156 -0.0213 -0.0243 -378.6 
(δ) (0.00181)** (0.00172)** (0.00181)** (0.00181)** (0.00175)** (0.00229)** (26.34)** 
Year   0.00023     
   -0.000238     
Constant (α) 0.173 0.173 -0.238 0.171 0.17  1,144 
 (0.000561)** (0.000709)** -0.474 (0.000126)** (0.000521)**  (21.44)** 
Observations 1,053,808 1,053,808 1,053,808 1,053,808 1,053,808 1,053,808 240 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.133 0.007 0.965 
 For columns 1-6, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 for patents granted to 
individual inventors and 0 otherwise; data are at the patent level. Column 7 reports 
results from data at the month-country level where the dependent variable is the count 
of patents granted to individuals. Coefficients on year dummies are not reported in 
column 4. Except for in column 2, “After” indicates that the patents was applied for 
subsequent to October 1, 1989, the effective date of the change of Canadian priority 
rule from first-to-invent to first-to-file. In column 2, the critical date is November 19, 
1987, the date of passage. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at p < 0.05  
** indicates significance at p < 0.01 
 
In columns 3 and 4 we include a linear time trend and year dummies, re-
spectively. This is to account for overall changes that might affect innovative 
activity in both the United States and Canada. The coefficient on the interaction 
term is unchanged, indicating unsurprisingly that there is not a large amount of 
overall change in the rate of individual innovation during this time period.  
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All of the regressions to this point have used a linear probability model. 
Since the dependent variable is binary, probit may be more appropriate,123 so 
we run a regression of the form: 
 
 p(IICt) = Φ (α + βC + γ * postt + δC * postt + ϵCt) (2) 
 
Column 6 reports the marginal effects from this regression. The magnitude 
of the coefficient (-0.0243) is a bit larger than in the base specification, but 
once again there is a statistically significant negative effect of the law change 
on individual inventor representation. 
In column 7 we report results from a regression of the same form as col-
umn 1, but where now IICt is the monthly count of patents granted to individual 
inventors. The result is consistent with the other specifications: there is a sub-
stantial negative impact of the law change on patents granted to individual in-
ventors, yielding 379 fewer of them per month. 
We next explore potential heterogeneity in the impact of the effect by 
country of inventor. If individual inventors are more likely to patent in their 
home countries, then we would expect to see a bigger impact of the Canadian 
law change on Canadian inventors relative to American or other inventors. Ta-
ble 7 reports results from this analysis. 
 
 
123. Since this is a difference-in-difference specification and the independent variables 
of interest are binary, it is unlikely that probit will yield substantially different results. 
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TABLE 7 
Effect of Priority Rule on the Fraction of Individual Inventors 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Canada 
(2) 
United States 
(3) 
All Other Countries 
After (γ) 0.000523 -0.0131 -0.0131 
 -0.00722 (0.00122)** (0.000882)** 
Canada (β) 0.0256 -0.143 -0.0136 
 (0.00736)** (0.00147)** (0.00132)** 
After − Canada (δ) -0.0488 -0.00852 -0.0222 
 (0.0119)** (0.00254)** (0.00209)** 
Constant (α) 0.364 0.238 0.0912 
 (0.00510)** (0.000872)** (0.000631)** 
Observations 29,836 555,335 468,637 
R-squared 0.001 0.015 0.001 
Each column reports results of a separate regression by country of inventor. The de-
pendent variable is a dummy that is 1 for patents granted to individual inventors and 0 
otherwise; data are at the patent level. “After” indicates that the patents were applied for 
subsequent to October 1, 1989, the effective date of the change of Canadian priority 
rule from first-to-invent to first-to-file. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at p < 0.05  
** indicates significance at p < 0.01 
 
Each column in the table is a separate regression run only on inventors 
from the specified country. In all cases, there is a statistically significant de-
cline in individual inventor representation following the Canadian law change. 
However, as expected, the magnitude of the decline is far larger for Canadian 
inventors: -0.0488, compared to -0.0085 for Americans and -0.0222 for all oth-
ers. This should come as no surprise that individual inventors in Canada are 
most affected by the Canadian law change. The decline in the fraction of indi-
vidual inventors among other nationalities indicates that Canadian law changes 
can still have a potential effect among foreign individuals considering patenting 
in that country.124 Together, the empirical results indicate a statistically signifi-
cant and substantial reduction in patents granted to individual inventors subse-
quent to the Canadian law change. 
 
 
124. There are alternative explanations as well, which we discuss further in the next 
Subpart. 
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C. Patent Quality Changes 
Besides the impact on individual inventors, the other major concern that is 
often raised about a first-to-file priority rule is that it will lead to lower-quality 
patent applications. Clearly, a first-to-file system encourages inventors to sub-
mit a patent application as quickly as possible following invention. The ques-
tion is whether this rush leads to lower-quality patent disclosure, undermining a 
major social benefit of the patent system. 
Patent quality is of course an extremely difficult characteristic to measure 
(and define), and it is beyond the scope of this Article to develop new tech-
niques. However, our datasets do allow us to test certain relationships that may 
(arguably) relate to the quality of patents; while by no means definitive, we 
think that these metrics provide at least a rough-cut evaluation of any patent 
quality changes as a result of the 1989 Canadian law change.  
Because our measurement of interest in this Article is how the shift to the 
FTF system affected individual inventors, we define “patent quality” as an in-
put into granted patent characteristics: the effort (resources) dedicated to the 
patent by the applicant.125 Thus, our metrics include: 
 The length (in words) of the first claim of each patent. Here, we expect a 
higher-quality patent to be more complex, and—all other things being equal— 
to have more words in the first claim. 
 Total number of claims. Again, we expect a higher-quality patent to be 
more detailed, and thus have more claims. 
 Claim language complexity. Here we utilized standard metrics of language 
complexity—the Flesch-Kincaid index and the Fog index—to measure claim 
language complexity.126 As before, the more complex, the higher quality.  
Given these metrics, if a “rush to patent” theory—where applicants limit 
time and other resource expenditure to hastily apply for patents—is correct, we 
should see a measurable decline in each of these measures. 
However, we find no significant change in patent quality due to the 1989 
Canadian law change using any of these measures.127 For illustration, note  
 
125. This is of course not the only way to define patent quality.  
126. For a description of the Flesch-Kincaid index, see J. PETER KINCAID ET AL., 
DERIVATION OF NEW READABILITY FORMULAS (AUTOMATED READABILITY INDEX, FOG 
COUNT AND FLESCH READING EASE FORMULA) FOR NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL 18-19, 38-39 
(1975) (modifying the Flesch Reading Ease formula to create a new measure of readability 
that relates the complexity of the writing to grade level). For the Fog index, see ROBERT 
GUNNING, THE TECHNIQUE OF CLEAR WRITING 31-35 (rev. ed. 1968). The advantage of these 
measures is that they are standard, require only limited programming to utilize, and are well 
understood. The disadvantage is that patent claim language does not adhere to standard con-
ventions of grammar and sentence structure, meaning these metrics are at best useful for 
identifying changes in claim language patterns rather than measures of claim complexity di-
rectly. 
127. We use the same difference-in-difference technique as employed above to examine 
the impact on individual inventor share. 
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Figures 5 and 6 below, which depict the word count of the first claim of each 
granted patent in Canada and the United States, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6 
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What we find, and can be seen in Figures 5 and 6, is a large drop in first 
claim word count during the time period of our analysis in U.S. patents. This is 
an interesting pattern, and one that suggests further research well beyond the 
scope of this project.128 What we can determine here, however, is that the 1989 
law change in Canada does not appear to affect patent quality (as measured by 
our metrics). 
D. Addressing Potential Concerns and Robustness Tests 
Although we believe we have identified—at least tentatively—a substantial 
effect on individual inventors as a result of the shift to a first-to-file rule, we 
have considered several possible confounding factors and limits to the conclu-
sions that we can draw from our analysis. Although we don’t believe that any 
of these undermine our basic conclusion, we address them below. 
1. The contemporaneous patent term change 
Along with the change to the first-to-file system, Canada changed the pa-
tent term with the law implemented in 1989. The patent term had been seven-
teen years from the grant date, and became twenty years from the application 
date.129 This change could potentially impact the fraction of individual inven-
tors seeking patents, and therefore could explain the results we find, rather than 
the patent priority system. When the United States made the same change in 
patent term, the net effect was an increase in patenting,130 so one might think 
lengthening the patent term could not account for the decline in the rate of indi-
vidual patenting observed here. But as Figures 7 and 8 make clear, the pro-
cessing time in Canada is substantially longer than in the United States. Prior to 
the Canadian law change, the processing time was about fifty-one months in 
Canada versus twenty-two in the United States. Thus, the net effect of the 
change in patent term is to decrease the effective duration of patent protection 
and thus decrease the incentive to patent generally.131 
 
128. We believe that this pattern in the U.S. data may be a response by inventors to 
changes in U.S. patent law wrought by the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit in 1982. The consensus is that the Federal Circuit greatly increased the likeli-
hood that patents would be upheld as valid, enabling patentees to seek broader—here, short-
er—claims. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit 
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA L. REV. 1105, 
1116-17 (2004). As we note in the text, this is an avenue for future research. 
129. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Rela-
tion Thereto, R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 33, § 16 (Can.); Ludlow, supra note 15, at 104. 
130. See David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Dura-
tion and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1614, 1642 (2009). 
131. See id. at 1622-26 for a discussion of the incentive effects of patent term changes.  
WAGNER & ABRAMS 65 STAN. L. REV. 517.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2013 4:08 PM 
554 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:517 
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Pendency (Days)
Canadian Patent Pendency Under First-to-Invent System (1984−1989)
0
20
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Pendency (Days)
U.S. Patent Pendency (1984−1989)
FIGURE 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WAGNER & ABRAMS 65 STAN. L. REV. 517.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2013 4:08 PM 
March 2013] POISONING THE NEXT APPLE? 555 
However, this decreased incentive to patent should affect both businesses 
and individuals, and it is not clear why the effect would be stronger on individ-
ual inventors. If anything, individuals tend to have higher discount rates, and 
thus a decrease in duration should make a smaller impact on their decision to 
innovate relative to businesses.  
Besides the direct effect on the incentive to innovate, the change in pro-
cessing time could also have heterogeneous effects by patent class.132 It could 
be the case that those classes that receive the greatest decrease in effective pa-
tent protection are also those with the greatest proportion of individual inven-
tors. To test this, we analyzed the individual inventor share of patents in tech-
nology classes, and then checked to see whether that correlated with mean class 
pendency—a positive correlation here (more pendency, more individual inven-
tors) might suggest that individual inventors were disproportionately affected 
by the patent term change. We did not find this correlation. If anything, we find 
that individual inventors tend to be (slightly) overrepresented in classes with 
lower pendency. Figures 9 and 10 depict these results graphically, before and 
after the shift to first-to-file, respectively. 
 
132. See id. at 1641-42 for an investigation of this phenomenon in the U.S. context. 
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2. The introduction of maintenance fees 
As noted in Part II above, one of the legal changes introduced in Canada in 
1989 (in the same patent reform bill as the shift to first-to-file) was the intro-
duction of maintenance fees, for both applicants and patent grantees.133 In gen-
eral, these fees require applicants (or grantees) to pay annually to maintain their 
applications or their patent rights.134 One possible concern is that the introduc-
tion of these fees might reduce patenting behavior, especially for individual in-
ventors. We think this is unlikely for several reasons. First, the amount of fees 
is small relative to the total costs of filing a patent for most applicants. We find 
that the median processing time (i.e., the time in the patent office) for Canadian 
patents filed after October 1, 1989, was 3044 days (or about eight years). For 
individual inventors, this time was shorter, at 2274 days. Under the fee sched-
ule, the maintenance fees would have thus added $500—or $250 for individual 
inventors—to the total cost of seeking a patent. However, other fees were re-
duced at the same time—for example, the “final fee” (due upon grant) dropped 
from $350 to $150 for small entities, thus almost balancing the impact of the 
new maintenance fees.135 
More fundamentally, we think that patent office fees, including mainte-
nance fees, are a relatively small portion of overall patenting costs. Note the 
contrast, for example, between the maintenance fees and the average of $7000 
to $12,000 in attorneys’ fees for filing original patent applications (depending 
on complexity and technology).136 Thus, a shift in patent office fees, on the or-
der of $300, should not have substantial impact on the propensity for inventors 
to patent their inventions.137 
 
133. See An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain Matters in Rela-
tion Thereto, R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 33, § 16 (Can.).  
134. The annual fee schedule for Canadian patent applications, which has apparently 
remained unchanged since 1989, is as follows: 
Years 2, 3, 4 $100
Years 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 $200
Years 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 $250
Years 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 $450
Note that small entities (including individual inventors) pay fifty percent of the listed fees. 
See Tariff of Fees—Patents, supra note 54. 
135. See id. 
136. Compare supra note 134 and accompanying text (detailing maintenance fees), with 
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 62, at 25 (detailing typical charges for in-
tellectual property-related legal services).  
137. There are other reasons to doubt the effect of patent fees on patent filings general-
ly. For one thing, a national patent office has a monopoly on the ability to grant patent rights. 
For another, the substitutes for patent protection—secrecy or unprotected disclosure—are 
seriously imperfect substitutes for the rights granted by a patent. 
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3. Deferred examination 
As noted above, Canada also introduced a deferred examination system in 
the 1989 law changes. Deferred examination systems allow patent applicants to 
file (thus securing a filing date), and only later request that the patent office 
conduct the substantive examination of the application. Typically, there is a 
limited window of opportunity in which the applicant can request examina-
tion—in Canada, the 1989 law set that window at seven years after the filing, 
but in 1992 it was changed to five years.138 
The idea behind deferred examination is that it allows for reduced work-
load on the patent office—many inventors will file applications but not request 
examination at all, abandoning the application. At the same time, deferred ex-
amination reduces some of the problematic effects of the first-to-file system—
namely, that applicants have strong incentives to file even before their inven-
tions are complete or they have information about commercial viability. 
Although we think that deferred examination can account for most of the 
large drop in the rate of patenting in Canada shown in Figure 2, in theory, this 
change should not have differential effects on patenting behavior across types 
of applicants. To the extent that it encourages early filings and additional aban-
donments before examination, the effect should be an overall reduction in the 
grant rate and an increase in pendency at the patent office—both of which we 
do see in our data. However, there is the possibility that the introduction of de-
ferred examination would systematically reduce patenting by individual inven-
tors—perhaps individuals are much more likely than firms to abandon their ap-
plications before requesting examination—and thus this change could account 
for some or all of the effects we observe in the 1989 law change. 
To test this possible confounding effect, we conducted a cross-sectional 
analysis based on technology classes in Canada and their increase in pendency 
as a result of the 1989 law change. If the observed decline in individual inven-
tor share is due to the introduction of deferred examination, we should expect 
to see more individual inventors in patent classes where there is more deferred 
examination—that is, where pendency is longer. We test this in two ways. First, 
for each patent class, we calculate the share of individual inventors and the 
pendency in Canada after the 1989 change. Contrary to the deferred examina-
tion hypothesis, we find a decreasing relationship between individual inventor 
share and pendency.139 We then attempt to control for the possibility of a 
preexisting relationship between individual inventor share and patent pendency. 
We do so by regressing the change in individual inventor share on the change 
in pendency. Here we find no significant relationship between the two  
 
138. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
139. A regression of individual inventor share on pendency yields a coefficient of  
-0.0001145 with a standard error of 0.0000245. This means that for an extra 1000 days of 
pendency in a patent class, the share of individual inventors will be about 1.1 percentage 
points lower. 
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variables.140 Overall, the mean pendency time in Canada post-1989 is 6.2 years 
for individuals and 7.3 years for corporations. 
Contrary to the hypothesis that deferred examination results in lower indi-
vidual inventorship share, we find no correlation between individual 
inventorship share and the increase in pendency resulting from the 1989 law. 
Indeed, we find that individual inventorship share correlates with reduced pro-
cessing time after the 1989 law change, suggesting that, if anything, individual 
inventors are not utilizing the deferred examination process as much as firms 
are. 
There is another way to test the deferred examination hypothesis. Immedi-
ately before the 1989 Canadian law change, there was a substantial surge in pa-
tenting behavior by individuals. Specifically, in the seven days prior to the Oc-
tober 1, 1989, implementation date, there was a threefold increase in patent 
applications as compared to a typical day in 1989 prior to that time—about 300 
applications per day as opposed to 88 per day earlier in 1989. That surge of ap-
plications was disproportionately comprised of individuals—12.5%, as opposed 
to 10.8% for the five years up to that point (and 8.3% after). This is significant 
because it suggests that individuals in particular were responding to the priority 
rule change (which was mandatory) rather than the deferred examination 
change (which is optional). Again, this strongly suggests that changes in indi-
vidual patenting behavior resulted from the priority rule change rather than de-
ferred examination. 
E. Interpretation and Analysis of Our Results 
As explained above, we find a significant decline in patenting by individual 
inventors relative to larger entities that is caused by the change in Canadian pa-
tent law from a first-to-invent to first-to-file priority rule. These results survive 
a number of alternative analyses and robustness tests, including investigations 
into the other changes that occurred in the same reform of the Canadian patent 
laws. In short, we find with some confidence that a shift to first-to-file from 
first-to-invent results in a reduction of patenting by individual inventors relative 
to firms. 
What is less clear from our results is (a) the mechanism by which this oc-
curs—why are individual inventors patenting less?—and (b) the overall welfare 
implications. We briefly outline our thoughts on these questions below. 
 
140. The regression of change in individual inventor share in Canada on change in pen-
dency yields a coefficient of -0.0000244 with a standard error of 0.0000181, which is statis-
tically insignificant. 
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1. Possible mechanisms 
Why do individual inventors patent (relatively) less under a first-to-file re-
gime as opposed to a first-to-invent priority system? Our data cannot answer 
that question definitively, but there are several possibilities, which we note in 
brief below. 
Fewer Resources to Allocate to Patents. As we’ve suggested in Part II 
above, a first-to-file priority rule places a premium on speed in completing an 
invention, identifying it as patentable, preparing an application, and filing. 
Firms will clearly have an advantage in this regard, so perhaps firms will simp-
ly win a disproportionate share of the “races” to the patent office. Note that this 
theory conflicts to some degree with the results of interference cases in the 
United States, where party type does not appear to correlate strongly with suc-
cess under the first-to-invent rule.141 But given the small number of interfer-
ences and highly selected cases, it is difficult to draw much strong evidence 
from this source. 
Less Invention by Individual Inventors. One possible interpretation of our 
results is that the change to first-to-file results in fewer inventions created by 
individual inventors, perhaps because of the marginal additional costs required 
to be successful patentees in a first-to-file regime. While this may be the case, 
there are alternative interpretations, so any conclusions here should be cautious. 
Most importantly, patent counts don’t tell the whole story about innovative ac-
tivity. Inventors can (and do) utilize a number of alternative approaches to pro-
tecting themselves in the marketplace, such as trade secrecy and first-mover 
advantage. It is possible (and even likely) that if the cost of patenting rises (as a 
result of the change to a FTF system), individual inventors in particular will 
continue to invent, but shift to alternative methods for protecting their inven-
tions. Therefore, the actual decline in innovative activity by individual inven-
tors is likely to be lower than the decline in patents they are granted.  
Demoralization. It’s also possible that individual inventors, after the 
change to a first-to-file system, become demoralized or disillusioned with the 
patent system, and accordingly seek fewer patents. Perhaps they view the first-
to-file rule as unfairly tilted in favor of firms, especially those with resources. 
Or perhaps they view the patenting process as increasingly related to luck as a 
result of the first-to-file rule. Note that this mechanism suggests that the effect 
on individual inventors may be independent of the real impact of the law, and 
that theory is consistent with the disproportionate surge of patenting by indi-
vidual inventors we observe in the several days prior to the implementation of 
the first-to-file rule. 
Individual Inventors Join Firms. It is possible that we find less patenting 
by individual inventors because they joined firms after the implementation of 
 
141. See Lemley & Chien, supra note 11, at 1320-23; Mossinghoff, supra note 13, at 
428.  
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the first-to-file rule, and their applications filed after 1989 are characterized as 
firm inventions rather than individual inventions. It might be possible to test 
this theory empirically, by matching up inventor names across the 1989 law 
change, and we note this as an avenue for future research. 
Shift to Patenting in the United States. While the impediments to patenting 
rose for individuals in Canada, there was no change in U.S. patenting standards. 
Thus, one possible explanation of our findings is that individual Canadian in-
ventors chose to forego patenting in Canada and patented in the United States 
instead. This hypothesis may be tested by examining only U.S. patent data be-
fore and after the Canadian law change. 
 
TABLE 8 
Impact on U.S. Patents by Country of Inventor 
 
Variables Coefficients & Standard Errors 
After (γ) -0.0124 
 (0.00113)** 
Canadian Inventor (β) 0.0805 
 (0.00486)** 
After-Canadian Inventor (δ) 0.0191 
 (0.00686)** 
Constant (α) 0.239 
 (0.000803)** 
Observations 492,784 
R-squared 0.162 
This regression is restricted to U.S. data in order to investigate the impact of the Cana-
dian law change on patenting behavior of Canadian and U.S. inventors in the United 
States. The dependent variable is 1 for patents granted to individual inventors and 0 
otherwise; data are at the patent level. “After” indicates that the patents were applied for 
subsequent to October 1, 1989, the effective date of the change of Canadian priority 
rule from first-to-invent to first-to-file. IPC class controls are included. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at p < 0.05  
** indicates significance at p < 0.01 
 
Table 8 indicates the results of this investigation. The dependent variable is 
the same as Tables 6 and 7, an indicator for whether the patent was granted to 
an individual. The key difference in this table (besides the data only including 
U.S. patents) is that the regressor of interest is the interaction term between af-
ter and Canadian inventor. This indicates the differential effect of the Canadian 
law change on the individual inventor share granted to Canadians relative to 
Americans in the United States.  
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The result is that the share of U.S. patents granted to individual Canadians 
rose almost two percentage points relative to the individual American share.142 
This is a substantial increase and points to a change in patenting behavior, 
whereby individual inventors in Canada may have continued to innovate, but 
focused their patenting efforts on the United States. The ability to turn to an al-
ternate patent system will not be open to U.S. inventors, as it was the last major 
country to use the FTI priority system.  
In short, our data do not provide a clear answer to the question of why the 
first-to-file rule yields relatively fewer individual inventors. It does, however, 
suggest that individual inventors thought that the change in priority rules was 
going to be harmful to them—and filed applications just before the implemen-
tation date accordingly. (Note that although the individual inventors’ share was 
higher during this surge in applications, firm filings make up the vast majority 
of the surge filings.) 
2. Welfare implications 
Opponents of a change to the first-to-file priority rule often suggest that the 
change will harm overall welfare by harming individual inventors (or small 
businesses), decreasing patent quality, or both. Our results show that the rule 
change does appear to reduce patenting behavior by individuals—though as 
noted above in Subpart III.E, we cannot determine why—but that it does not 
appear to negatively affect patent quality (at least on some metrics of patent 
quality). 
What, then, are the overall welfare implications of our findings? We urge 
caution. While we are confident that we’ve identified a real effect on patenting 
behavior by individuals as a result of the shift to first-to-file, there is nothing in 
our results that suggests that this has resulted in less invention overall. That 
said, if one felt strongly that individual inventors are uniquely productive or 
unusually likely to create socially valuable innovations, then one might inter-
pret our findings as showing negative welfare effects from the first-to-file rule. 
Another caveat, as outlined above: we can’t rule out that more individual in-
ventors either join firms or utilize alternative protection mechanisms. 
Further, even if the decrease in individual inventor share of patenting was 
understood to be a welfare loss, the first-to-file rule might nonetheless be a net 
benefit to society—by virtue of reducing the complexity and administrative 
costs associated with the first-to-invent rule. That is, the savings from the re-
duction in administrative costs might well outweigh any losses associated with 
the reduction in patenting behavior by individual inventors. 
What we can say with some confidence is that the change to a first-to-file 
rule must indeed have welfare implications. The former first-to-invent rule was 
 
142. The regression reported includes IPC technology class controls. Other specifica-
tions, including year dummies, time trends, or no controls yield similar results. 
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costly and complex, so its elimination will have a substantial impact. Further, 
our point estimate suggests perhaps a fourteen-percent reduction in the share of 
individual inventors receiving patents as a result of the first-to-file rule.143 To-
gether, these two changes will have, we think, an impact on innovation and so-
cial welfare, though the direction and magnitude is unknown. Indeed, the diffi-
cult—and potentially uncomfortable—question for supporters of the America 
Invents Act raised by our study is how much individual inventors’ share of pa-
tenting should weigh on our patent policy decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
When President Obama argued that the America Invents Act would simpli-
fy the U.S. patent system, “cut[ting] the red tape that stops too many inventors 
and entrepreneurs from quickly turning new ideas into thriving businesses, 
which holds our whole economy back,”144 he was almost surely alluding (at 
least in part) to the change from first-to-invent to first-to-file. As we’ve shown, 
this change will surely simplify and streamline the U.S. patent system—but at a 
cost. Whether the reduction in individual patenting translates into a net reduc-
tion in innovation—or if it does, whether that loss is offset by the simplification 
of the priority rules—is a question we cannot answer, but which obviously calls 
for further study. 
Notwithstanding the images of Edison, Hewlett and Packard, Jobs and 
Wozniak, how much do individual inventors matter to American innovation? 
That, we think, is the critical question suggested by our study. To date, most 
observers seem to have assumed that our shift to the FTF rule, though a sub-
stantial change in U.S. patent law practice, will have little impact on who seeks 
and receives patents. We demonstrate that this is wrong. The change to the 
first-to-file rule in the United States will likely result in a reduction of individu-
al inventors’ share of patents. Thus, the cost savings yielded by the priority 
rules changes in the America Invents Act will not, we suggest, be free. 
 
143. See supra Part III.B. In Table 6, the coefficient for the base specification is  
-0.0149. That represents a 1.49 percentage point reduction in the share granted to individuals 
in Canada relative to the share the law change. Because the pre-law change rate was about 
10.8%, that in turn suggests about a 14% drop in relative share. (The ratio of 1.49% to 10.8% 
is about 14%.) 
144. Remarks on the Federal Budget, supra note 6. 
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